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West Europe Report

(FOUO 41/80)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

FIRST 'ASMP' TACTICAL NUCLEAR MISSILE DESCRIBED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 12 Jul 80 pp 81-83

[Article by Pierre Langereux: "'AMSP,' the First French Air-to-Ground Tactical Nuclear Missile"]

[Text] The ASMP medium-range air-to-ground weapon system, which is to go into service in the latter half of 1985,¹ is the first airborne tactical nuclear missile made in France. It is intended for in-depth attack against strongly defended tactical objectives such as communications centers, command posts, airports, etc. For this purpose, the ASMP will be equipped with a thermonuclear warhead presently being developed by the CEA [Atomic Energy Commission]-DAM [expansion unknown].

The ASMP has been designed especially to be mounted on the Dassault-Breguet Mirage 2000, which will be the principal carrier of the new missile. The ASMP will also be installed on the 15 Mirage IV strategic bombers that will be kept in service until 1985,² as well as the Navy's Super-Etendards (replacing the AN 52 tactical nuclear bomb). These various airplanes will carry a single missile, either underwing, in the case of the Super-Etendard, or under the fuselage, in the case of the Mirage 2000 and the Mirage IV. Furthermore, the first airplane to be equipped with the ASMP will be the Mirage IV, with the Mirage 2000, in the version designed to carry the ASMP, going into service in 1986. France has planned to acquire a little less than 100 specimens of this version.

The installation of the ASMP missile has been designed so as to reduce the tasks on board the airplane to the minimum, which has led to extensive automation of the operations.³


There are two principal phases, each initiated by an order issued manually and then proceeding automatically.

Preparation for firing consists particularly in putting the missile's computer and inertial plant into the proper initial configuration: automatic transfer to the computer of the target coordinates and of the data characterizing the position and speed profile of the trajectory to be followed, and copying by the missile's inertial plant of the parameters of the airplane's inertial plant.

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ASMP missile undergoing wind-tunnel test at ONERA [National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research]. Note the two bi-dimensional air intakes.



The low-altitude launching sequence can then be initiated. It ends with ejection of the missile. The procedure for dropping the ASMP missile is similar to that for the AM 39 air-to-surface antiship missile, also developed by Aerospatiale. It is the "drop and light up" procedure: the missile is first dropped downward, inert, and then the solid-fuel acceleration booster is ignited at a safe distance from the airplane.

Once it is released, the ASMP missile is entirely autonomous.

The ASMP is a supersonic missile weighing less than 1 ton and measuring a little more than 5 meters. It uses an inertial guidance system (therefore unjammable) to follow a trajectory that is preprogrammed for direction and altitude. In flight, the missile is driven by a ramjet and piloted on the three axes by four aerodynamic control surfaces positioned in the rear of the fuselage.

The ASMP missile has the possibility of following very diversified trajectories so as to increase its penetration capacity, and its range of flight is very extensive in speed and in altitude--more than Mach 3 at very high altitude--which makes the ASMP practically invulnerable in view of the performance characteristics of the means of antiaircraft defense. The range of the ASMP alone--not including the distance covered by the airplane--is more than 100 kilometers, but it varies considerably with the flight profile

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(high or low altitude, ascent, descent, maneuvers). (Cf the review PARADOXES, 31 May 1980.)

The penetration capacity required of the ASMP implies, on the one hand, that the missile fly at speeds well above supersonic, at high and low altitudes, and on the other hand, that it have sufficient maneuverability with high load factors and be able to adapt its flight profile to the relief of the terrain (in accordance with a preprogrammed trajectory) so as to be sheltered from enemy means of detection and interception.

The performance characteristics required of the ASMP therefore practically imposed the choice of the ramjet for propulsion in order to achieve the desired range and maneuverability within the limits of mass and bulk imposed by its being carried under the airplane, while at the same time having a sufficient payload (nuclear warhead) carrying capacity. Maneuvering capacity under heavy load factor necessitates in particular the ability to modulate the engine's thrust, which is precisely what is made possible by the ASMP's ramjet, which has a very satisfactory thrust-regulation ratio.

The choice fell to a liquid-fuel (kerosene) ramjet in preference to a ram rocket burning autopyrolyzable solid fuel, which would not have permitted the very broad range of trajectories required (low and high altitudes). This was despite the fact that ONERA had demonstrated its mastery of ram rockets with two successful flights of test models at the CEL [Landes Testing Center] in 1976.⁴ But the kerosene-ramjet formula was also well-known in France, notably through the work of ONERA, Nord-Aviation and Sud-Aviation. Aerospatiale, which has inherited experience from these two companies, had in recent years worked in particular on the kerosene fuel-supplying of ramjet engines. But it is to ONERA that credit is due for the resumption, in France in 1972, of the principal work on the ramjets, especially the perfecting of the "vortex-type combustion chamber," the extremely elaborate geometry of which makes it possible to stabilize flame combustion naturally, without using the traditional flame-dampers of the preceding generations of ramjets.

The kerosene fuel supply to the ramjet is done without pumps, by putting the fuel tank under pressure. Kerosene (density 0.78) was adopted for the ASMP because it constituted a known solution at the time. But studies are presently being conducted by ONERA and the IFP [French Petroleum Institute] on new "heavy" fuels (density up to 1.1), of the Shellydyne or Cerchar 2 type, which have higher performance, for an eventual second generation of air-to-ground nuclear missiles.

This ramjet-propulsion missile formula has also oriented the choice of the aerodynamic configuration of the missile, perfected mainly in ONERA's wind tunnels at Modane. The missile has two bidimensional air intakes. The two air scoops, which lead the air to the ramjet's combustion chamber, are extended by two fairings (narrowing toward the rear of the missile) designed to improve the missile's aerodynamics and to house certain equipment, including the servomotors for the aerodynamic control surfaces. This config-

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uration ensures sufficient lift and maneuverability without it being necessary to provide the missile with wing surface. The accelerator is of the "integrated booster" type: the solid-fuel grain is placed in the combustion chamber of the ramjet--an effective method for reducing the dimensions of the missile. This accelerator takes the missile to the speed necessary for startup of the ramjet (in the range of Mach 2), starting from a drop speed higher than Mach 0.6. The complete combustion of the solid-fuel grain then frees the combustion chamber for the operation of the ramjet with a kerosene-air mixture. This transitional phase is a delicate one in the operation. It is necessary to go as rapidly as possible--so as not to lose speed--from rocket propulsion to ramjet propulsion. Therefore, the change of propelling nozzle (by ejection of the accelerator's nozzle and clearing of the ramjet's nozzle, which has a bigger neck), the opening of the air ducts (closed off up to this point), and the firing of the ramjet have to be done in a fraction of a second.

The perfecting of this transition phase necessitates important tests on the ground and flight tests. Aerospatiale has a special installation at Subdray, near Bourges, for carrying out bench tests, including a short phase of ramjet combustion. ONERA installations, fitted out especially for the ASMP, are being used: the Palaiseau wind tunnel for developing the combustion chamber under the conditions required for the whole range of flight, and the wind tunnel at Modane, particularly for on-the-ground checkout of the complete propulsion system.

Development of the ASMP air-to-ground medium-range weapon system was launched in Spring 1978, upon completion of preliminary studies that had begun in 1974.⁵

Aerospatiale (Tactical Missiles Division) received an initial contract of about 500 million francs (1978 prices) for development of the ASMP weapon system, not including development of the nuclear charge being made by the CEA, and the furnishing of various test facilities, services of the state in particular. This amount includes the development of the missile itself and devices for preparation for firing and for dropping (electrical and computer and missile-launching interfaces box) for fitting to the Mirage 2000.

ONERA is cooperating with Aerospatiale in development of the kerosene ramjet and testing of it throughout the ASMP's entire flight range. Aerospatiale is directly responsible for the airframe of the missile and the solid-fuel booster, whose charge is made by the SNPE [National Powder and Explosives Company]. The program's other principal subcontractors are SAGEM [General Electrical and Mechanical Applications Company] for the inertial plant, EMD [Marcel Dassault Electronics] and SAGEM for the guidance computer (derived from the M-4 and the Mirage 2000), and Air Equipement for the piloting jacks. The thermal batteries are furnished by Aerospatiale.

Aerospatiale has already begun the flight-testing of the ASMP, which will continue until it is placed in service. For the moment, they involve launchings of missile mockups from the ground--with the aid of an additional

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solid-fuel booster--to check the functioning of the propulsion system, and in particular, the transition between the booster phase and the ramjet phase. The flight-testing of complete missiles from airplanes will begin in 1982.

Several auxiliary airplanes of the CEV [In-Flight Testing Center] will be used for the flight tests of the ASMP.⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf AIR & COSMOS, No 718.
2. Col Guy Lewin, Assistant Director of the CPE [expansion unknown], REVUE DE DEFENSE NATIONALE.
3. Cf the review L'ARMEMENT, No 55.
4. Cf AIR & COSMOS, No 674.
5. Cf the review L'ARMEMENT, No 55.
6. Cf AIR & COSMOS.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

'HADES' MISSILE, PLUTON'S SUCCESSOR, DESCRIBED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 12 Jul 80 pp 83-85

[Article by Pierre Langereux: "'Hades,' Long-Range Missile, Successor to 'Pluton'"]

[Text] Who could succeed PLUTON if not HADES?* The first French ground-to-ground tactical ballistic" missile, placed in service in 1970, will be succeeded by a "ground-to-ground tactile nuclear" missile, which will not necessarily be ballistic!

The designing of the HADES missile, which really got going in 1977 after 2 years of preliminary studies, has resulted in a missile with range more than doubled over that of the PLUTON missile (15 to 120 km) presently in service; this will make it possible to increase the survival capacity of the HADES weapon system by keeping it far from the zone of contact. The missile will be fitted with a tactical nuclear warhead developed by the CEA [Atomic Energy Commission]-DAM [expansion unknown], but could also eventually carry a neutron charge if such a weapon were to be produced in France.

It has also been decided that the HADES weapon system--missile and launching base--will be mobile. HADES will be installed on a Berliet-type all-terrain vehicle of the French Army. The increased range, which puts the missile's firing bases farther back, enables the HADES to use a road vehicle rather than a tank, as with the PLUTON. Each HADES vehicle will be able to handle two missiles (vectors plus payloads), which will be fired from inclined position (about 60°) from a container-erector-launcher that protects the missile during transport and storage.

The firing procedure will be automated to the maximum so as to simplify the crew's task and give greater flexibility to the use of the missile. The weapon system will be equipped with automatic devices for testing the missiles and erecting and tilting the containers, but with the possibility of functioning in nonautomatic mode also.

* Pluto is the king of the underworld in Roman mythology, and Hades is the god of the underworld in Greek mythology.

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It is also certain that the HADES, like the PLUTON, will be a single-stage missile, thus retaining its integrity during its entire flight until impact. The nuclear charge remains joined to the vector, which is piloted during all phases of flight (propelled or not), in accordance with the information from the missile's inertial-guidance system.

Two Concepts

But two concepts of the HADES missile are still in competition with one another.

One is of a "semiballistic" solid-fuel missile (that is, one whose nonpropelled phase is piloted also), very similar to PLUTON in its conception, its functioning and its general architecture. But on the other hand, the solid-fuel engine of the semiballistic missile would use a new Butalane composite solid fuel from the SNPE [National Powder and Explosives Company] with a PBHT binder, of higher performance than that used for the PLUTON missile. The two French "missilemen," Aerospatiale and MATRA [General Mechanics-Aviation-Traction Company], have each submitted proposals to the DTE [Missile Technology Directorate] for this version of the HADES missile.

The other version is a supersonic missile with aerobic propulsion by liquid-fuel ramjet--preferably heavy fuel, or kerosene as an alternative--and a solid-fuel (Butalane) integrated booster. This would be a missile of the ASMP air-to-ground medium-range missile type, which also uses ramjet propulsion. Aerospatiale and MATRA are also in competition over this concept, with different technical approaches to the general architecture of the missile. Furthermore, a version derived directly from the ASMP is being examined.

Thus there are five variants of the missile in competition to be the successor to the PLUTON. Depending on the version, the HADES missile weighs between a little more than 1 ton to a little less than 2 tons (the PLUTON weighs 2.4 tons), with a length of about 7 meters (the PLUTON measures 7.70 meters); and the diameter of the HADES missiles falls between that of the PLUTON and that of the ASMP missile. Two options are also open for the inertial plant of the HADES missile's guidance system; it could be a plant very similar to that of the ASMP, associated with a "north searcher," or a plant close to those of the ballistic missiles with self-alignment capacity. SAGEM [General Electrical and Mechanical Applications Company] is the only firm in the field for this version, and is in competition with the SFIM [Measuring Instruments Manufacturing Company] for the preceding version.

As regards deployment of the HADES weapon system, the DTE plans to reuse as far as possible (with some modifications) the presently existing "PLUTON depots"--four or five--to house the new missiles with their nuclear charges and the transport and launching vehicles.

The new weapon system will also be served by "HADES regiments," but with a larger number of missiles than for PLUTON (30 missiles on tanks deployed by 5 regiments), so as to be able to handle considerably more targets.

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Whichever concept is finally decided on for HADES, no less than 10 years will be needed to produce the new weapon system.

Gen Guy Mery, chief of staff of the Armed Forces, recently indicated, for his part, that the successor to the PLUTON "is necessary within short time-limits."

Fr 5 Billion for Nuclear Weapons in 1980

The CEA, Department of Military Applications (DAM), has exclusive responsibility for the designing, development, testing and fabrication of all nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, made in France.

The CEA-DAM acts at every point along the chain of production of nuclear weapons. It explores for and mines natural uranium and produces--through its subsidiary, COGEMA [expansion unknown]--the nuclear materials (mainly plutonium and enriched uranium) in the Marcoule and Pierrelatte plants. It designs and manufactures the nuclear weapons in its six military design centers in metropolitan France. Finally, it keeps the nuclear weapons in service at the military bases--"special-munitions depots-shops" (DAMS)--at the highest level of reliability and safety.

For the last 20 years, the CEA has also had responsibility for design and construction of the nuclear reactors for the naval propulsion of the SNLE's [Missile-Launching Nuclear Submarines] and, more recently, of the SNA's [Nuclear Attack Submarines].

The Naval Propulsion Group (GPN) of the CEA was created on 8 June 1959 with the mission of designing and building and "Land Prototype" (PAT) of a nuclear engine for the SNLE's, and also prime responsibility for the nuclear propulsion of the SNLE's. Since August 1974, the activities of the GPN, which in the meantime had become the Department of Naval Propulsion (DPN), were transferred to the Technicatome company, a subsidiary of the CEA and of EDF [French Electric (Power) Company].

The decision to build the PAT was made on 18 March 1960, and the nuclear boiler, using highly enriched uranium, diverged on 14 August 1964 at Cardache, reaching its nominal power on 24 August 1964. Since then, the PAT has functioned without failure for training the crews responsible for operating the nuclear boilers on board the SNLE's.

To date, the CEA has built the nuclear boilers of the five SNLE's of the FOST [Strategic Naval Force]. The boiler of the new sixth SNLE, the "Inflexible," is being built.

The CEA has also built a "Prototype Advanced Boiler" (CAP) which diverged on 24 November 1975. This reactor, construction of which has been financed jointly by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Industry, has made it possible to develop the more compact boiler designed for submarines of lower tonnage than the SNLE's--that is, the SNA's. The boilers for the first two SNA's have been built.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

NEW THOMSON-CSF TARGET ACQUISITION SYSTEM

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 12 Jul 80 p 87

[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Search Unit of the SICA (expansion unknown) Weapon System"]

[Text] Thomson-CSF [General Radio Company] has just released this previously unpublished photo of the new search and acquisition unit of the SICA all-weather low-altitude ground-to-air weapon system. This search unit is mounted on a Hotchkiss-Brandt vehicle of the "Crotale" type, but with six wheels instead of four. The Thomson-CSF search radar detects any threat up to 18.5 km, a range which enables it to coordinate the fire of four SICA Firing units. Each of these firing units, mounted on the same vehicle, has six SICA missiles on ramps, ready for firing. The SICA missile has an effective range of more than 10 km, as has been demonstrated by many firings.



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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: IRAN, EUROPE, ENERGY, OTHER ISSUES

Paris PROJET in French Sep-Oct 80 pp 920-932

[Article by Pierre Hassner: "The Foreign Policy of Jimmy Carter, or the Misfortunes of Virtue"]

[Text] "Four years to change the world," that was the title an enthusiastic admirer of President Carter gave in 1977 to a book devoted to the new era which the latter was supposed to be ushering in. At this hour of reckoning one is tempted either to extend the prophecy by a question: "Yes, but for the better or for the worse?", or to turn it around into "Four years to be changed by the world." Unless -- if one remembers President Carter's admission about how the invasion of Afghanistan taught him more about the Soviet Union than three years of being president -- one is tempted to combine the two versions using the expression: "Three years to try to change the world, three days to be changed by it."

To Change the World?

In talking about the Carter experiment it is easy to stoop to the petty game of ironic and cruel phrases. The unequalled number of blunders, gaffes, contradictions and course changes the American President has been given to, and the serious crisis of confidence between the United States and the rest of the world, from adversaries to allies, this has resulted in, would seem to provide ample justification for this. However, it must be resisted, and particularly in France, where opinion seems to be divided between, on the one hand, a principled anti-Americanism for which Carter like his predecessors is only an expression of the interests of imperialism and can only follow the Machiavellian dictates of the Trilateral Commission, and, on the other hand, an unconcealed nostalgia for Kissinger and even -- a special feature of the French public -- for Nixon, who are by contrast highly revered great masters of European-style "Realpolitik [power politics]."

These two views, stressing either the structural constraints on any American policy or the importance of strategic-diplomatic skill, each contain a share of truth; but they must stand correction one by the other and most of all because the insight was no less true and important, -- although easier to

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attack -- which Marc Ullmann expressed three years ago: the insight into the effort to recover -- after the ordeals, crimes, and compromising situations of the Vietnam war and the Watergate affair -- a restored and generous America, bringing a positive message to the world once again. If Carter's failure poses a problem for us, that is perhaps because it is due to his good points as much as his bad ones, to the nobility of his ambitions as much as to their confusion, and to his effort -- full of naivete but not without grandeur -- to push aside the old cynical rules of diplomacy and power politics.

In the history of American foreign policy one constantly finds a double polarity: of idealism and realism on the one hand, and of isolationism and interventionism on the other. In terms of the first contrast, "phase one" Carter represents an idealist reaction to Nixonian realism. Reagan, and to a large extent "phase two" Carter, represent a return to realism. In terms of the second contrast, Carter, in his better times, represented an attempt to get past two terms, to set up a forceful posture in the world -- by using words and money -- which would steer clear of recourse to military force.

In both cases the problem with his failure is knowing whether the ambition itself was based on an illusion or whether, on the contrary, it failed for lack of being pushed far enough and pursued with enough sincerity, stubbornness and perseverance, or, finally, if one must put primary blame on the technical incompetence of the President and his team, and their incapacity to set themselves priorities, lay out a strategy and stick to it.

An Optimistic Tragedy

Depending on his philosophical and political preferences each person will be inclined to favor either the first or the second interpretation, but everyone will be able to agree on some version of the third. Whether Carter has been too ambitious or too idealistic or not enough, what is striking is the lack of coherence among his ends, among his means, and especially as between the former and the latter. Stanley Hoffmann on the subject of the Carter policy had recalled the good intentions with which hell is paved. Robert Tucker is right to point out that the optimism underlying the vision of the world on which those intentions were founded is particularly open to question. This is an optimism about goals which Carter and his advisers seemed to develop an idyllic conception of; they were blind to the tragic element of the human condition in general and of politics in particular, that is to say the conflict between equally urgent exigencies or between equally respectable values. This is an optimism about the current situation, as much about the position occupied by the United States within the world strategic and economic equilibrium as about the degree of convergence or compatibility among its goals and values and those of the other actors on the international scene. This is an optimism about means and, in particular, the effectiveness of declarations, symbolic stands, and statements of principle. This is an optimism, finally, as to organization, based on the assumption that (as opposed to the Kissinger cult of centralization and secrecy) the international policies of a great power can be carried out both in the atmosphere of a diversity of contradictory voices and in public at the same time, thereby leading to a constant cacophony out in public.

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From this comes the contrast between the harmonious and peacemaking nature of the architectonic vision of the world to strive for, the disorganized and contradictory nature of postures and instant initiatives, and the absence of a medium-term strategy tasked with coordinating them. From this also comes the impression, notably vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, of a reversal of Theodore Roosevelt's precept ("speak softly but carry a big stick"): the special feature of the Carter administration seems to be speaking louder while carrying a slenderer stick. From this comes, finally, in the face of disappointments coming from outside the country and the pressures of American opinion, the danger of a sudden reversal, which is not unprecedented for Democratic administrations; these often come into power impelled by dreams of universal reconciliation and they react to their failure by shifting to the other extreme. After all, one of the roots of John Kennedy's involvement in Vietnam really seems to have been the feeling that he had to show proof of being tough and firm to compensate for the impression of weakness left with Khrushchev at the time of the Vienna meeting. Thus, the Carter administration, which began by minimizing East-West relations and the role of military force is finishing up by giving the impression that it has as its only theme the need to punish and contain the Soviet Union and to reestablish the Western military presence.

And yet. . . If one abandons the world of speeches for that of achievements, and if one considers the Carter administration's achievements not in the light of its statements but in the light of what it inherited and of the alternative solutions its opponents put up, one is tempted to take up its defense. Or at least to accept that it has been punished where it has sinned. It wanted to introduce (or rediscover) a foreign policy approach that was simultaneously universalist, pluralist, populist, and public, but the clumsiness inherent in the style of this approach has tended to obscure its sometimes beneficial and important results. The magic of Kissinger consisted of transforming defeats into victories; the curse of Carter consists of making victories themselves resemble defeats.

The initial optimism, the proclaiming of absolute principles, and the conflict out in public over viewpoints held within the administration threw into the background the complexity, the contradictions, and the real constraints of a situation it did not create (but sometimes tended to aggravate or to ease) and certain aspects of which, in any case, it understood much better than did its detractors.

Its tragedy is to be caught up in the contradictory aspects of the real world one by one or successively rather than as a whole; and there is an excuse: it is easier to avoid hesitancy and misunderstanding if one ignores, as does the traditional right, the dimension of universal principles or of social change, or, as does the traditional left, the dimension of the balance of power and military force. Rereading today Carter's speech at the University of Notre Dame on 22 May 1977, one smiles at sentences like: "Having confidence in our own future, now we are liberated from that excessive fear of communism which previously led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in our fear" and "We hope that the Soviet Union will join us in playing a larger part in assistance

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to the developing world, for efforts of joint assistance will help us to build up a base of mutual trust." Is not a naive ignorance to be seen there of the constraints of geopolitics and Soviet intentions, to be belied soon enough by the way both the one and the other behave, including Carter's behavior himself?

But, at the same time, one endorsed companion sentences such as: "For too many years we have been inclined to adopt the deplorable principles and techniques of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our values for theirs. This approach has failed. We can no longer separate traditional questions of war and peace from new global questions of justice, equity and human rights." How could one not approve of this implicit criticism, looking back or looking forward, of the approach of a Kissinger, ready to subordinate everything to geopolitics, or of a Reagan, author of the immortal phrase: "There would be no hot spots in the world if it weren't for the Soviet Union"? That Carter might have forgotten sometimes the element of truth in their message and sometimes the element of truth in his own critique just shows his hesitations and uncertainties. For all that, do we have to prefer the certainties of the great simplifiers?

A Chaos of Clear Ideas

To explain the Carter administration's amazing mixture of lucidity and naivete, the most illuminating expression comes from an unexpected source, Emile Fa-guet's phrase about Voltaire: "A chaos of clear ideas."

From his threefold personality as a Christian, a Southerner, and a nuclear engineer, Carter had derived three key ideas: an interest in introducing morality into international politics (where the human rights theme comes from), sensitivity to racial problems, particularly African ones (embodied by Andrew Young), and lastly a cautious attitude regarding nuclear weapons and a belief in disarmament (where the revival of non-proliferation themes, the pursuit of large arms reductions in the SALT negotiations, and the decision against the neutron bomb come from).

From the activities of the Trilateral Commission he had retained not some kind of mysterious political strategy for controlling the world but rather a stress on the themes of economic interdependence and the global problems of the planet -- as opposed to Kissinger's strategic-diplomatic emphasis -- and on relations with allies rather than with adversaries.

On the other hand, from the personal style of his adviser, Z. Brzezinski, he had kept an optimistic faith in the calling and the cultural and technical lead of the United States -- as opposed to the Spenglerian pessimism attributed to Kissinger -- and in the need for an affirmation from outside that the U.S. is a young and dynamic nation and for a more aggressive strategy of detente, at least on the level of words.

Finally, from the paralysis which since Cambodia and Watergate obstructed executive-congressional relations, he had learned the need for a populist foreign policy resting at every moment on that internal consensus which, in the United States, could not be based on classic diplomacy.

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Was not each of these ideas clear and justified? In most of these areas, President Carter's views, however simplistic, represented a healthy awareness of urgent and vital problems to which the Nixon administration like the Europeans gave insufficient priority. But for almost every one of them, excessive ambition as to goals, insufficient perseverance in their execution and, most of all, the lack of attention to how compatible a chosen policy was with objectives sought in other areas, was bound to jeopardize the results.

Thus, from the first weeks, two goals excellent in themselves -- improvement of relations with allies and nuclear non-proliferation -- came into conflict with reference to the American opposition to the Franco-Pakistani and particularly the German-Brazilian nuclear agreements. The intention to coordinate the Western countries' economic policies just served to add fuel to the flames. The human rights policy, the way it was announced and put into practice, did not seem very compatible with the simultaneous pursuit of SALT agreements on new foundations more favorable to disarmament but less favorable to the USSR, suddenly proposed to the latter at the same time as the letter to Sakharov. In relations with right-wing dictatorships allied with the United States, this human rights policy came into conflict either with other policies meant to be universally applied (what should Brazil be asked for first: concessions on human rights or on nuclear non-proliferation?) or with American or Western interests, either strategic or economic ones (Iran and Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and even the People's Republic of China).

Doing It By Trial and Error

In the face of this cold shower which has been inflicted on its initial optimism, the Carter administration has reacted in different ways depending on particular cases.

An initial reaction consisted of keeping different areas separate, and even making that into a doctrine: the rejection of Kissinger-type "linkage." The United States would continue to maintain its principles or "project its values," for example on human rights, while negotiating with the Soviet Union in the area of arms and while striving to help the latter's adversaries to put up resistance. After all, the Soviet Union would do as much; but the human rights policy then ran the risk of either remaining merely rhetorical and marginal or bearing the brunt of "counter-linkage" applied by those it was aimed at, from the Soviet Union to Argentina or Brazil.

Consequently, three types of less satisfying behavior fairly quickly gained the upper hand. One is the coexistence of statements and actions contradicting them as per official spokesmen; from this sometimes comes the impression of there being a division of labor: for example, between Andrew Young stressing North-South relations and praising the stabilizing role of Cubans in Africa or the saintliness of Khomeini, and the Department of State, or Brzezinski to an even greater extent, calling for determined stands against them; an impression perhaps also of a struggle for undefined influence (for example, between Vance and Brzezinski, one denying and the other asserting the link between SALT

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negotiations and the behavior of the Soviets in the Third World), of hesitation or swinging back and forth on the part of the President; Carter seems to successively give first place to one or another policy -- such as during the spring of 1978, regarding Africa --, or changes his mind in the middle of a crisis -- such as at the different stages of the Iranian affair --, or abandons the neutron bomb -- seemingly because of genuine qualms of conscience -- running counter to his advisers who have just extracted an agreement from the European allies with great difficulty.

Going beyond these swings back and forth, some real changes in direction have taken shape on one or two occasions. Vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and arms control, initial exuberance (marked by the take-off on human rights and the SALT proposals of March 1977) rapidly gave way to a more conciliatory stand: Carter played down the human rights theme and signed the SALT II agreement in Vienna in July 1979, based on positions much more favorable to the Soviets than anticipated. However, beginning in spring 1978 following the Shaba and Ethiopia affairs and the revival by the United States of the China card (Mr Brzezinski's visit to Beijing in May, then Deng Tsiao-Ping's to Washington in December, and normalization), a second more important watershed was becoming operative, which the Iranian and Afghan affairs are giving a radical and to a large extent irreversible nature: a hardening and an emphasis on the need to stop Soviet expansion.

Within the administration itself, the partisans of the primacy of North-South relations (Andrew Young), arms control (Paul Warnke and Leslie Gelb) and American-Soviet detente (Cyrus Vance himself) are losing ground, and even their jobs, to the benefit of the partisans of the primacy of East-West confrontation. Among these latter, Zbigniew Brzezinski is almost abandoning the language of globalism and trilateralism for that of geopolitics, dear to the heart of his predecessor Kissinger. The pursuit of bases in the Indian Ocean and setting up a rapid deployment force are replacing fruitless negotiations with the Soviet Union over demilitarizing the Indian Ocean or limiting the arms trade. Regarding states as diverse as Pakistan and India or Argentina, from now on the imperatives of containment or competition with the USSR are lifting prohibitions linked to the policies of non-proliferation or of human rights, which seem like luxuries of days gone by.

An Empirical Compromise

However, contrary to appearances, what prevails in fundamental areas, including arms, is an empirical compromise between contradictory demands; public opinion sees the clumsiness or the hesitancy in carrying out this kind of compromise, but it sometimes disregards its relatively effective and reasonable nature.

Thus, in Latin America, relations with Mexico are an example of clumsiness; the United States supported Somoza too long, then remained caught up too long in searching out a third road for Nicaragua which was not to be found; the same quest for a third track runs the risk of leading it to failure vis-a-vis the revolutionary situations in El Salvador and Guatemala; the human rights

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campaign displeases and upsets the dictatorships of Latin America without overthrowing them or genuinely reforming them, and leads them more towards turning to Moscow or Europe. Nevertheless, a juncture has been reached, which entails putting Chile at a distance and a liberalization of Brazilian policy. Above all, the Panama Canal treaty is ratified (at the cost of an intense battle against a right-wing opposition led by Ronald Reagan and guaranteed vast support by American opinion); intervention in Managua was averted and relations with the Sandinista regime, to which \$75,000,000 of assistance has been granted, are good.

In Africa, the Carter administration can quite rightly be reproached for its passive behavior vis-a-vis the Cuban, East German and Soviet presence in Angola and Ethiopia, and for reacting overmuch to the ambiguous Shaba affair. But for settling the Rhodesian problem, the American attitude, even after Andrew Young's departure, is an example of moderation and discretion and is allowing British diplomacy and the parties in contention to win one of the rare victories of recent times for the West and for peace.

In these two areas of the world, Carter's policy has shown itself to be generally more enlightened than that of Nixon and Kissinger, not to mention that which Reagan and his advisers recommended.

On the other hand, nobody will defend the swings of the Carter administration in the Iranian affair: the enthusiastic support of the Shah, "friend of human rights," the hesitation and contradictions at the time of crisis, the failure of the undertaking to rescue the hostages and the double-dealing vis-a-vis its allies which that revealed, the humiliations and illusions of the pseudo-negotiation linked to the U.N. commission, and the guaranteed ineffectiveness of sanctions decided on and of the efforts to impose them on its allies. However, in this area as well, the basic American responsibilities were ones from the previous administration and its unconditional support of the Shah; Carter's patience during more than six months was not without merit; also it was impossible to not react at all and a military intervention to save the Shah or to overturn the new regime would have been suicidal.

In the same way, one can argue that regarding Afghanistan the United States should have reacted more than it did in 1978 and, by contrast, refrained from certain ineffective reactions in 1980; but it could neither prevent the coup of April 1978 and the invasion of December 1980 nor not see in it an action jeopardizing regional balance and calling into question the overall policy of the Soviet Union -- and therefore at the same time appeal for an attempt to restore the first and issue a serious warning to address the second.

Patience and Effectiveness

But most of all, in three areas the Carter administration after going through a thousand episodes of clumsiness and mistakes has shown praiseworthy evidence of adapting to reality, to the point where its balance sheet clearly comes out an "overall plus" in that respect.

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Regarding NATO, a technical revitalization effort underway since 1978, and the reestablishment of American relations with Greece and Turkey which had seriously deteriorated during the period prior to that time, showed that the Carter administration could be patient and effective. But most of all, after the blunders committed on the neutron bomb and on SALT II negotiations, which showed the imprint of Soviet-American bilateralism and neglect of European interests, American diplomacy now is simultaneously able to take into consideration the Europeans' objections and demands, particularly those of Chancellor Schmidt, regarding the European strategic balance and Soviet SS-20 missiles, is able to undertake the leadership of negotiations within NATO, and, at the same time, is able to take the Europeans' desire into account to link the introduction of American missiles to a serious attempt to negotiate with the Soviet Union. From this comes the decision of 12 December 1979 which nevertheless, whatever its technical defects may be and whether or not it is jeopardized by political developments and by the maneuverings of some parties and the blunders of others, has registered an undisputed success.

As for the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Carter administration came into the picture at a time when the Kissinger-style "small step" approach was seemingly not able to yield anything more. President Carter's somewhat naive obstinacy in talking about peace rather than "partial withdrawals" seems to have re-launched the negotiations. First these took the form of a search for an overall settlement, with the help of the Soviet Union and via the channel of the Geneva conference. President Sadat's initiative, partially aimed at speeding up these negotiations, surprised the United States. However, not only was the latter able to adapt to it, but President Carter's stubbornness at Camp David extracted an Israeli-Egyptian peace which in spite of its limitations has made the prospects of new hostilities in the Near East recede considerably.

These limitations, undoubtedly due in part to American blundering, are showing up more and more distinctly; but also in this area, the signs of gradual change in America on the Palestinian question are more marked (even more than one could have expected in an election year). Even if certain records for double-dealing and hesitancy have been set during this period (at the time of the vote at the United Nations on Jerusalem or of Andrew Young's contacts with the PLO), one cannot accuse President Carter of having lacked perseverance or flexibility on the Near East.

Lastly, on the fundamental problem of energy, people will wax ironic about the rhetoric of Carter's speeches, they will criticize the substance of the successive programs proposed to Congress, and they will jeer at the way in which the latter has torn them to pieces. However, as compared with his predecessors, it is to President Carter's credit in a fundamental sense that he has attempted to dramatize the problem facing his fellow citizens, and that he has not concealed the fact that to solve it requires change in their everyday behavior, and even their conception of society; finally, he seems to have obtained some results because in 1979 American conservation measures made progress and energy imports went down, becoming lower than the 1977 ceiling fixed by him.

In the area of non-military nuclear energy, the results of Carter's policy are less positive. The work of the conference which was started up on his

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initiative (on the evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle) hit him with a categorical refutation of his policy, particularly regarding plutonium; and one can argue, as do French experts -- like Mr Bertrand Goldschmidt --, that excessive ambition and the rigidity of American ideas have harmed the non-proliferation cause more than they have helped it.

Certain governments, which have achieved results in practice which are not negligible ones in the struggle for human rights in East-West relations, make the same criticism of Carter's policy: too much ambition and publicity hurt its effectiveness. This is undoubtedly true, but too much realism and resignation do as well. Even if, in both cases, the United States has lacked a coherent strategy, its naivete has undoubtedly been more useful to humanity than the blase cynicism of many governments. At least this is what, in the case of human rights (including the sanctions after the Afghanistan invasion), almost all the dissidents in the East -- led by Andrei Sakharov -- think, in spite of the argument often made in the West that it is they who would bear the brunt of Carter's denunciations.

A Missed Rendez-vous

That being the case, faced with a balance sheet which shows so many positive aspects, why is there this unquestionable verdict of failure which the vast bulk of American and world opinion agree on?

Certainly, what the head of one of the two great powers can least be pardoned for is hesitancy and unpredictability, not to mention weakness and ridiculousness. Therefore, whatever stage a policy of his may be at, one is always wary of a gap between verbal undertakings and actions and a dominant strategy being absent. Regarding the Persian Gulf, today's American hawks, like yesterday's European defenders of human rights, wonder if Carter is not making promises, during a period of Soviet superiority which they hope is temporary, which he will not be able to honor.

On a more profound level, the Carter administration after several months of success has come to know in a yet more serious way the same failure for which it justly reproached its predecessors: not managing to find a common language for America and the rest of the world. In 1977, in our article on "The Ambiguities of the American Empire," we had cited Brzezinski's article, "America in a Hostile World" mentioning the gap between America's vision of the world, concerned mainly about the status quo, and that of the rest of the world, concerned mainly about change. He saw the solution for that in an American initiative: a vast cooperative world plan according to which the United States would make itself the creative spokesman for the aspirations of humanity. At that time we had asked a two-fold question: could the conditions of internal American consensus and of world consensus coincide? And, above all, did not the planet's political, ideological and cultural heterogeneity risk being too great for the common body of problems to be able to end up in a consensus on answers?

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Reality has without a doubt, at least provisionally, answered these two questions in negative fashion. On the global level, the gap between the demands of the South and the preoccupations or interests of the North takes any credibility out of the North-South dialogue. The ideological opposition between East and West robs the dialogue on arms control and the Western hope, in particular the American one, and Carter's, to replace tests of military force by the management of interdependence, of its impact to a very great extent. In particular, the growing role of military force in Soviet policy reduces the optimistic portion of American theoreticians and diplomats to silence little by little. Finally, certain forms of religious revival seem on the international level more to be agents of divisiveness, lack of understanding and intolerance than of reconciliation; the impossibility of any dialogue between the Ayatollah of Qom and the Baptist of Georgia is symbolic and disquieting in this regard.

What Jimmy Carter has undertaken has found at some points and on some problems -- human rights and racism -- tones of universal scope, which is quickly covered up again by the violence of resentful feelings and fears, by the difference of mentalities and interests.

This first failure was all the more inevitable and bitter because it was based in part on a second misunderstanding which sets President Carter apart from the American people. To be sure, after Vietnam and Watergate, that people yearned to find their innocence or a clear conscience again; they looked for the exact opposite of Nixon and therefore were not mistaken by choosing Carter. But at the same time, dating from before the election, one saw in opinion polls a change that ran deeply counter to Carter's initial pacifism and ecumenical good will: the yearning for a restoration of power, military included, and for a new nationalism, based on being "fed up" with the retreats and humiliations symbolized by Vietnam.

To be sure, Americans in 1976 were not -- and are still not -- in favor of starting up military adventures again here there and everywhere. That is why Carter, faced with Reagan, can with some success take up themes linked to detente and the danger of war. But they are in favor of pursuing their national interests and, in a hostile world, defending them without standing on ceremony; from this comes a growing unpopularity of foreign aid and a growing popular support for military expenditure. In both cases the Carter administration, which has campaigned to increase the first and reduce the second, has fought rearguard action with concessions and contradictions (note the affair of the Soviet brigade in Cuba) but always along pacifist lines.

These opinion trends, which are more accentuated since 1974-1976 and have been crystallized by the Iran and Afghanistan affairs, explain Carter's development and Reagan's popularity, especially seen in the light of a more general phenomenon, the desire for strong leadership (joined, as Huntington observes, to the desire for less government activity). Though one can reproach Carter for his contradictions, American opinion seems to nourish just as fundamental ones. On the domestic level, it yearns for more presidential

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leadership while the evolution of institutions (particularly Congress and the parties) and of American society make that almost impossible. On the international level, it longs for more American leadership when the economic, military, political and social requirements for that are no longer met.

Is Carter a victim of the world's contradictions and those of America? Yes, to a certain extent. But just as much, of course, he is a victim of his own contradictions and particularly of his own illusions. He is a victim also -- and here lies not only his tragedy but all of ours -- of that portion of truth of a universalist message which, in a world racked by crisis and sudden confrontations, arrives either too early or too late.

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BEAN-EATING PEST MUTATIONS STUDIED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 6-12 Sep 80 p 50

[Article by Fabien Gruhier: "Is This the End of Everything?"]

[Text] The kidney bean appeared in Europe in the 17th century without its familiar parasite. Eventually, however, the bean weevil managed to cross the Atlantic and the farmers are trembling. . . .

Prof Vincent Labeyrie adores his little beasties. The basement of his laboratory* in Tours is infested with them. He cherishes them, raising millions of these Acanthoscelides obtectus--bean weevil--under all possible conditions, in air-conditioned, pressurized, and lighted premises, thus simulating a great variety of weathers. "The bean weevil is a fascinating animal. It will become as famous as the fruit fly," the famous vinegar fly which has helped in the discovery of most genetic laws.

Yet, this small insect is quite insignificant. Two to three millimeters long and ugly like a louse, it has, above all, the detestable habit of ravaging bean crops. In the small African farms three-quarters or virtually all bean crops are being currently destroyed by the bean weevil. "However, this is a type of nonmarketable food production without statistical figures. In such a case one either underestimates or ignores the scourge." Alas, Africa does not have this exclusive privilege: "Thirty years ago, the Landes area in France was a leading bean producer," Vincent Labeyrie says. "But the bean weevil came." The bean crop ran away, seeking refuge in the north, in the Pas-de-Calais area: "The bean weevil cannot withstand the cold."

It cannot withstand the heat as well: At 36 degrees it can no longer reproduce. This whimsical behavior has allowed the Tours crew to go back

* Institute of Experimental Biocenosis of Agrosystems

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to the origins, and to identify the place where this famous weevil came from. The navy bean which can sprout anytime, even if set in moist cotton in the middle of winter on a kitchen shelf, as all of us know from grammar school, is a tropical South American plant. Consequently, the bean weevil is closely related to it. The navy bean is indispensable for the reproduction of the weevil which is its only known parasite. The Labeyrie team has logically marked on an atlas the areas in South America which are tropical without being too hot or too cold. The only area meeting such specifications was that of the high Colombian plateaus. It went there and discovered the bean weevil.

Tropical Frenzy

From Colombia to tropical Africa where, as in Ethiopia, for example, it has found habitats which are the exact duplicate of its native country, the bean weevil has followed the navy bean which is a universally desired crop. The navy bean was introduced in Europe at the end of the 17th century. The bean weevil rejoined it only at the end of the 19th century, coming from the United States, unquestionably as a result of progress in navigation: In the past the travel was too long for the insect to survive. It is thus that, in Europe, for two centuries the bean enjoyed total respite. This was the true golden age of the navy bean. However, ever since its close enemy rejoined it, the navy bean has been endangered. The bean weevil is steadily advancing. Today it has been noted as far as the Ural Mountains. It is said that it is the Belgians who took it to Zaire as a result of which it has caused disasters throughout Africa.

The bean weevil loves the very ripe bean plants. With an infallible flair the females find the properly dried pods. They open them with their mandibles and lay inside several dozen eggs. The larvae pierce the beans, settle inside and grow. A single pod could thus nourish some 20 baby weevils until puberty. As adults, these little monsters come out and fly over the field seeking a new ripe pod.... As though accidentally, the cycle of the bean weevil--several weeks--is perfectly synchronized with that of the bean growing in a tropical system, producing about 10 crops per year. "It is a marvelous example of co-evolution," says Vincent Labeyrie. "The bean and the weevil are made for each other."

This may be the case in a tropical climate. What about France? In a bad year there could be no more than one good bean crop. By what miracle does the weevil, sensitive to the cold, survive the winter? "That is what is fascinating," answers Vincent Labeyrie: "It has adapted itself." It has not abandoned its reproduction cycle of tropical frenzy: In the winter the weevil lays its eggs in attics. The insect has become accustomed to such an unheard-of thing in nature: the bag of dry beans. What makes this even more astonishing is that normally the weevil is horrified by the shade to the point that it never touches plants that are

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even slightly protected from the sun. "We have no explanation," the Tours researchers admit. "However, this is precisely what makes the study of the weevil fascinating: It should enable us to elucidate the transition mechanisms which divide a savage from a domesticated species."

Naturally, waiting in an attic is a last resource. Even though several generations of weevils spend the winter inside the bean bags without seeing daylight, the moment the good weather is back, with ripe pods, they all fly to the closest truck garden. Experiments have been made such as concealing a square planted in beans quite far, in the very midst of a corn field. Yet, the young weevils leaving the attic, guided by mysterious emanations fly straight to their favorite vegetable.

Digesting the Beans

Beans are toxic to all other creatures: In the course of evolution, in order to struggle against predators, leguminous crops, including beans, have surrounded their seeds with a poisonous tegument. Thus, should you decide to eat a plate of raw beans you would find yourself quite quickly in the hospital. Happily, boiling destroys the toxic substances." The extraordinary detoxication enzymes. It alone could eat the raw bean, the most important of all leguminous crops. It is true that most other leguminous crops such as kidney beans, peas, and chick-peas of all kinds, have also "their own" weevil especially equipped on the biochemical level to digest the seeds. The peanut alone--the "ostrich leguminous" refuses to protect itself with a toxic layer. It would rather hide its seeds in the ground. However, the moment they are taken out and harvested, obviously, the peanut weevil appears....

The strangest case is that of soybeans, another leguminous whose weevil has never been identified. "We do not know the soybean weevil," Vincent Labeyrie says. "Do you realize what this means? Obviously, this weevil is certainly extant somewhere. One should go to China most urgently to search for the weevil and study it, and eventually develop means to fight it. Meanwhile, we are helpless. If ever this unknown weevil were to come unannounced, it would be a catastrophe for the soybean fields of Europe and the United States."

Meanwhile, the researchers are already quite busy with the properly identified weevils: a symposium organized in Tours on such insects recently rallied representatives of some 40 nations. The bean weevil by itself is already a global problem. Yet, the supreme cure exists: All that it takes is to raise beans in the shade, combining them with corn, pick them the moment they ripen, shell them immediately, and store them in sealed premises. "It is too simple," sighs Professor Labeyrie. "Furthermore, farm officials, the personnel of the official services, always prefer solutions based on chemicals. Ah, if only we were to recommend the use of a miraculous powder, they would be willing to help us!"

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

COUNTERESPIONAGE COOPERATION--There is more mystery regarding the arrest of the East German Gen Heinz Bernhardt Zorn. The general had been picked up at Lille like a beginner with secret documents on new French tanks and AT weapons. Here is what happened: Zorn's informant had been turned around by Belgian counterintelligence agents. But the latter thought that their legislation was not strict enough. Rather than seeing the general released after a few months, they preferred to pass the whole affair on to the French of Territorial Surveillance. Viewed from Brussels, the French Government Security Court has quite a few attractions! And so the informant set up a rendezvous with Zorn in Lille where the spy went without any suspicion. [Text] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 13 Sep 80 p 116] 5058

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FRANCE

GENERAL ON POSSIBLE REASONS FOR SOVIET POLAND INTERVENTION

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 6-12 Sep pp 36-37

[Article by retired French General Georges Buis: "What Would Spark Off a Soviet Intervention in Poland?"]

[Text] The Europeans, who have once again learned what fear is, will not die for Danzig--sorry Gdansk--at least this time. This is not because the Polish strikers and government have signed agreements but because the "great war" can only take place if the superpowers confront each other. The United States has openly played a "partner's game" in the Polish affair. The most that President Carter did, since he could not disregard the U.S. voters of Polish origin, was give financial aid to Poland to buy grain and food products. That is nothing new. Annual U.S. aid in that sphere was already around \$550 million. It will be increased to \$670 million. That is more likely to relieve the Soviets than to worry them. It is one way of telling them: Poland is your affair. In the more precise plane of its own military strategy, how far can the USSR allow the new freedom of maneuver the Poles have just won, to develop?

Favorable hypothesis: The USSR consents to what its Polish henchman, Edward Gierek, had confirmed in form--the results of a Warsaw summer full of more future threats than the Prague spring ever was. Gierek, who remains faithful but has little confidence in his police force, agreed to the results, no doubt, to try to channel them into the background. No mere call to order therefore, on the one hand Poland is not Czechoslovakia; and on the other hand even the USSR might think twice before risking a Budapest at the level of a relatively powerful nation whose bravery, shown unflinchingly throughout history, is particularly dangerous since it has never shrunk from an element of madness. The USSR is probably not anxious to intervene alone unless it becomes absolutely vital to do so. In order to send their troops to Prague the Warsaw Pact countries had accepted the story of a government which was "betraying" its people. In Poland's case they could not hide the fact they would be marching against a people. It would be a dangerous test to propose that they should do so.

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The End of a Stupid Race

Unfavorable hypothesis: Polish deviationism as it develops over weeks or months, might be regarded in Moscow as dynamic enough to lead the whole country to a national brand of communism. The dividing line would then be crossed, the Poles moving from the dubious to the intolerable. Moscow would not act because of the risk of contaminating neighboring countries. The small GDR is crushed under the weight of Soviet weapons and services: 30 aircraft bases and 20 divisions (10 armored and 10 mechanised). In the other neighboring country, Czechoslovakia, 5 Soviet divisions are present to "maintain order"; and there are 4 divisions in Hungary.

The intolerable is of a military nature, on the level of general strategy where geography dictates. In the present state of affairs, counting on large numbers as usual, the USSR is mobilizing NATO's military effort by deploying 31 divisions and thousands of combat aircraft on its western front, namely on the territory of the East European republics. These are air divisions and squadrons supported by a second front of 65 divisions stationed in Belorussia. Poland lies between these two masses.

Even if the "steam roller" operation "across the great plain of the north" is not very plausible, the USSR poses the threat of it by the strength and distribution of the military implement stationed there. This threat vanishes if Poland defects; for instance if its internal development leads it to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact or, more importantly, if it chooses a nonalignment model like Yugoslavia. Of course, that is an extreme case, a hypothetical case but one which would lead the 65 Soviet divisions in Belorussia, the Ukraine and Russia not to move toward the West in a smooth thrust through Poland but to be forced to win the right to cross Poland and, after that battle, reopen the country's logistical network and its 60 airports. That would doom the huge and terrifying maneuver to failure. On the other side, in the NATO camp, it would mean the end of a stupid race to plug gaps with divisions while praying that the "graduated response" would not lead to nuclear war. It would be a liberation.

Stern Warning

The loss of access to the Baltic Sea via the Polish coast would also be serious for the USSR. It would probably force the USSR to abandon the planned maneuver by the big amphibious and airborne units in the military districts of Lithuania, Latvia and Leningrad toward the West German and Netherlands coasts.

Any military intervention by the USSR in Poland under any circumstances would be a tragic adventure. It will, therefore, only be decided--but if it is it will be all-out intervention--if Poland's membership of the

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Warsaw Pact were in any way called into question. It is this recall to reality that we must read between the lines of the stern warning which PRAVDA addressed to the Polish strikers the very day of the celebrations which marked the signing of the agreements in which the USSR sees merely an annoying--but, it hopes, remediable--error in Poland's political itinerary.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

POSSIBLE LONG-TERM INTERDEPENDENCE IN ENERGY, FINANCE, POLITICS

Paris FUTURIBLES in French Jul-Aug 80 pp 11-24

[Article by Jacques Lesourne, chairman of the International Environment Long-Term Group of the 8th Plan: "France and Its International Environment"]

[Text] It goes without saying that I am here as chairman of the working group on the long-term outlook for France's international relations, rather than as chairman of the employment committee. Permit me, to begin with, to situate the work of this group in relation to the Interfuturs project that many of you know about.

The differences are considerable. First of all, it involves thinking done from an exclusively French point of view. On the other hand, and in contrast with Interfuturs, none of the dimensions of interdependence are excluded. Thus, problems of defense or of cultural relations are tackled. Conversely, the group has not been preoccupied with the questions of adaptation or rigidity relating specifically to the developed societies, and therefore has not gone into an entire area covered by Interfuturs. The national character of the work has often made it possible to reflect on the possible strategies of outside forces in a more explicit way than had been done in the Interfuturs report, which naturally had to take account of the sensitivities of the various member governments of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. A number of ideas only suggested implicitly in the Interfuturs report are therefore expressed more explicitly in this document.

The document "France in the World" is the fruit of reflections of a working group and not of a permanent team. Despite the essential contribution by our excellent rapporteurs, Mr Rosen and Mr Farhi, this approach has limits of which we are all aware. On the other hand, it permits a rich exchange of experience, and the composition of the group was of exceptional quality in this regard. The group did not have to work in the spirit of a committee, which explains why it did not formulate recommendations as such but rather presented a document intended to serve as a basis for the work of the foreign-relations committee or of the Plan-development committee.

It also goes without saying that the report "France in the World Tomorrow" and the report "Europe in the Next 20 Years" form, in our minds, a whole,

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since it is obvious that for France, the future of European relations constitutes an essential aspect of its environment.

A final preliminary remark: the group was convinced from the outset of the necessity of a long-term analysis of the international evolution for the working-out of the 8th Plan. The taking of the international dimension into account will be one of the major aspects of this plan. But nothing could be more illusory than to believe that the outlooks for French society are determined by the international evolution and that we have no option other than passive adaptation to constraints imposed from the outside. Thus the group has attached great importance to the work of the other two future-oriented groups--on technology, and on employment and French society.

As always when a report has been written under short time limits, one would like, when it is finished, to be able to write it again, with another plan. In this morning's presentation, I will follow a general line that concentrates on bringing out the possible orientations of a long-term policy for France in the area of international relations.

Instead of starting with the international environment, I will start from France, its strengths and its weaknesses, to examine the problems it will be faced with in the choice of its geographical strategies and its strategies by area. After that, I will take up, on the basis of scenarios, the problems of choice of type of development.

Strengths and Weaknesses of France

In a long-term perspective, the only strengths of a country such as ours are its human resources, the men and women who make it up, the way in which they behave, in which they cooperate, the type of society that they are capable of creating. There is no worse illusion than to forget this obvious truth.

But the French have a certain number of trump cards from the start: their country's economy has already been largely modernized, and their foreign exchanges have been strongly reoriented. They have the support of a network of international relations that is very exceptional for a country of this size. They have solved two of the big postwar problems: that of reestablishing a solid economy, and decolonization. Moreover, the debate on institutions has now become relatively secondary.

But naturally, France also has its weaknesses. First of all, population prospects that are not very favorable beyond the next decade. The problem is less the absolute volume of population than the risk of loss of dynamism. I have always had the fear that the developed countries, to the extent to which they could become countries of greybeards in the long term, might have difficulty in understanding the young societies of the Third World, which are still psychologically young.

France is poor in energy and raw materials.

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Its economic activities are not well-rooted enough in a number of sectors in which the future lies.

France is a country of rigidities, even if we tend to exaggerate them sometimes; but we have an example of this in our economy's sensitivity to inflation and unemployment.

In view of these relatively "heavy" characteristics, how can we describe the world geopolitical outlooks from the point of view of France? A note of caution: since France, like any society, is a complex being, the priorities, the essential geographic zones, the fundamental types of interdependence are not all the same but vary from one acting force to another and from area to area. Whence the necessity of a coordinated functioning of French society in which the geographic priorities and the area priorities are modulated in function of the forces concerned.

The World Geopolitical Outlooks

To begin with, let us consider the outlook for our foreign relations by zone.

For France, the first circle is that of the European Economic Community. Using the work of the group chaired by Jacques Pelletier, we have attempted to establish a diagnosis of Europe's long-term problems. The difficulty in diagnosis comes from the coexistence of strengths and weaknesses. The weaknesses? They are well-known: energy dependence; the place of European industry in the international division of labor, at least in certain sectors; an agricultural sector that is powerful but whose production costs will remain distinctly higher than world market prices in the next 2 decades; a deteriorating demographic situation; military vulnerability that has become obvious to everyone since the events of Afghanistan and the installation of the SS-20's, etc. But one perhaps forgets that this Europe also has advantages that derive from its people, the size of its market (at the end of the century, the EEC's market will still be the second-largest in the world), its technical potential, its cultural diversity, its links with the different countries of the world--both in its role as the linchpin of the EEC's trade and in the very great diversity of its cultural and human exchanges.

The report stressed an essential point that is poorly perceived by French society, which tends too much to dramatize the institutional debate on Europe. What is being created in Europe is not a nation, to be sure, but a new being, a family of nations, a being which, properly speaking, has no equivalent in history but which will have a significance in the multipolar and interdependent world of tomorrow. A family of nations? This means partners who have relatively but not completely coherent strategies and who take advantage of these strategies to interact with other groups of forces, and especially the most powerful.

The analysis confirms the importance for France of this first circle and of the partner-level actions that develop from it. As a family of nations,

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Europe can contribute a lot to the stability of the multipolar world that we are entering into.

A word about the future role of the Mediterranean part of Europe. In all probability, the rate of growth of industry will be faster in Mediterranean Europe and in peripheral Europe than in the center of Europe. Mediterranean Europe will be so much the more important because it is very close to that essential zone of the world that is North Africa and the Middle East.

The second circle for France is that of the developed world, that of the Trilateral Commission, one might say, with its three poles: the EEC, North America and Japan.

I do not want to repeat here the analysis that I have already presented at Arc-et-Senans¹ on the change in the role of the United States and the emergence of Japan. But I will stress the necessary strengthening of the weak side of the triangle--the relations between Japan and the countries of Western Europe. For the economic and political stability of the world, it is important to develop these relations, not only in their economic aspect but also in their political and cultural aspects. It would be easy to cite some recent examples that bring out the drawbacks of the weakness of these relations.

Within this triangle, the problems of cooperation among governments naturally has an essential aspect. It is less a question of restoring exclusive leadership by the United States than of defining relations that permit of possibilities of functional flexibility while at the same time establishing forms of cooperation that are of absolutely prime importance in order to keep world disequilibria from getting completely out of control.

The third circle merits particular analysis. It is that of the trilogy: on the one hand, the Middle East and North Africa--that is, the countries of the Arab League; and on the other hand, Black Africa.

The importance of this circle derives first of all from the fact that the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, which hold a large part of the world's oil resources, are exposed in the long term to a particularly preoccupying situation. We are so aware of the enrichment of these countries that we lose sight of the major problems that they will experience when they have to support 300 million persons at the end of the century. For them, entry into the post-oil era will be difficult, and all the more so because their rate of self-sufficiency in food is dropping regularly and their industrialization is not yet off to a good start. Moreover, these countries all suffer, politically, from internal fragilities. Finally, the past and chance have made this zone a mosaic of countries with oil and countries without oil, which does not help to increase stability. As regards

1. See "Europe and the Challenges of the Future"--Report of the 3rd European Conference on the Future, FUTURIBLES, No 31, February-March 1980.

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the currents of exchange--oil currents, industrial currents, human currents, whether they involve conflicts or not--between the northern and southern Mediterranean areas, the importance of this North African and Middle Eastern zone for Europe is strikingly obvious. It is a zone in which I include countries that do not belong to it, properly speaking, such as Turkey, whose history in the last 20 years has been a slow entry into underdevelopment, whereas at the end of World War II, one might have expected a different evolution.

Our ties with Black Africa are obviously, in the long term, of a different nature. The human and agricultural problems there are such that development will be slow and difficult, and Africa will probably remain one of the world's two great zones of poverty at the end of the century. We have human and cultural ties with it, but also economic exchanges centered on raw materials and strategic relations.

A fourth zone seems important to us in the long term as regards relations with France: that part of the Third World that is in the process of emerging as an industrial power. It involves regions in which France has sometimes been present, as in Latin America, or from which it has been remarkably absent, as in certain countries of the Chinese diaspora or in Southeast Asia.

From the point of view of the developed countries--and France can help shape it--nothing is more important than the insertion of these countries, which constitute a sort of middle class of the world, into world exchanges and into the management of the world economy. Naturally, these countries pose other challenges to other French forces, since their markets and their industries open up considerable potentials to our enterprises but are often also at the origin of importations that in the long term assume a readaptation of our productive apparatus.

Next comes the circle of the countries of the East. The group has attempted to analyze the probable slowdown of their growth, due, among other things, to the slowdown in the increase of their working population and to the necessity of passing from growth based essentially on capital accumulation and increase in the working population to growth resulting from better combination of the factors of production. It is also necessary to take account, in the medium term, of the military situation that we presently see--a situation characterized by the existence of a time gap during which the military superiority of the Soviet Union will be considerable on the level of both conventional weaponry and strategic forces. In the longer term, it is necessary to be aware of the nightmare that may haunt the nights of Brezhnev's successors: a nightmare marked by the nuclear sanctuarization of the Chinese territory; by the reemergence of the national problems within the Soviet Union--Helen Carrere d'Encausse has stressed this phenomenon, which will doubtlessly not have any effect yet in the coming decade; by the emergence, within the Soviet Union, of new values, new questioning, new power groups; by the instability of the relations between the Soviet Union and the people's democracies of the East, a problem that has never been solved since the end of World War II.

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Naturally, the regions of the world that concern France are not limited to these successive circles. France cannot be indifferent to other zones, especially to those countries which at the end of the century will still belong to the poor regions of the Third World, and that will be found principally in Africa and South Asia. As regards these countries, France can make its contribution to more general policies. There remains China, with more than a sixth of the world's population in the year 2000. China, at the dawn of the next millenium, will doubtlessly be in the process of becoming a great industrial power. France could very specifically prepare the future of Franco-Chinese relations by participating in the scientific and technical training of the future Chinese elites.

The circles that I have just listed do not correspond to the view of the world that one would have set out 10 years ago. It is in this perspective that the regional strategies of French society as a whole and the particular strategies of the different acting forces that make it up--the milieus of industry, agriculture, scientific research, cultural activities--can be defined.

The Problems of Interdependence

I will be brief as regards the strategies by area. The working group's report has distinguished three types of problems:

- the problems of cultural relations and defense;
- the problems connected with interdependencies of flow: flow of energy, of raw materials, agricultural products, industrial products, of knowledge, financial flow;
- the problems related to the mechanisms of interdependence: the international monetary system, the rules of international trade, the international institutions.

Separation of these various aspects of interdependence is necessary in order to be able to paint a true panorama of how French society fits into the international domain.

For lack of time, I shall limit my remarks to cultural exchanges and defense--two themes that are not discussed in Interfuturs.

In a world in which cultural exchanges will no longer be conducted in relations of dominance, France is going to have to solve quite a difficult problem of partial redeployment of its cultural relations. History has created some very close cultural bonds between France and certain countries, but the evolution of the world will require it to develop its cultural exchanges with other regions of the world. Simultaneously, it will have to avoid letting our traditional exchanges fall below the intensity that can ensure their permanence. The limits on our means will therefore force us to make some difficult choices.

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Two points in particular engaged the attention of the working group.

The first concerns the training and education of the French people, with the necessity of maintaining both cultural openness and professionalism: cultural openness because in the multipolar and interdependent world that is in the making, knowledge of other societies, other civilizations, and sensitivity to historical phenomena seem essential for a country like France that will maintain relations with the world's most diverse countries; and professionalism because it will be one of the conditions for French society's competitive capacity.

The second point has to do with France's contribution to the training of the elites of the Third World. We note every day that to the extent to which France has participated in the training of persons who hold leadership positions, mutual understanding and the development of balanced exchanges are infinitely easier. But it is not certain that in our priorities, in the organization of our educational system and of all the training activities that we are developing, we are attaching sufficient importance to the training of the elites of the Third World.

As for the problems of defense, the report assigns an important place to them, and the working group had decided that it would be so well before the invasion of Afghanistan. The report stresses the role of the French strategic nuclear forces and the necessity of constantly maintaining them at a minimum level in relation to technological progress. Next, it examines the difficult problem of the means that permit pinpoint action at a distance, in a world permanently on the boil in which Europe's vital communications may be gravely threatened. These two exigencies certainly imply both an increase in the defense budget and the elimination from that budget of expenditures that are almost completely useless from the point of view of the effectiveness of our defense.

Having detailed the possible relations between France and the different world zones and the strategic problems by area, the group set itself, finally, to reflecting on some overall scenarios of world evolution, taking into account both the outlooks for the world as a whole, those of the European Economic Community, and the choices of France.

The Breaks and the Discontinuities

All thinking about scenarios must start from analysis of the breaks and discontinuities, for we are in a period of great uncertainties, and it is useful to localize some of the possible breaks.

In order for there to be a break, it is necessary for an initial shock to give rise to cumulative mechanisms that make the consequences of the shock practically uncontrollable.

An analysis of breaks therefore supposes that localizes the places where the shocks may occur and evaluate the probability of cumulative mechanisms mak-

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ing the shock uncontrollable. To take an example, one can quite easily imagine a shortage of oil, due to a political revolution, leading to an incapacity to organize the shortage on the international level, with major price rises, acceleration of inflation and aggravation of unemployment in the various countries, and finally, major demands in certain countries, engendering economic or political upheavals in their turn.

The first of the possible breaks is naturally in the area of energy, its origin being events of a political nature.

Another possible zone of rupture could be in the monetary and financial area. We all know that recycling of oil income has been provided for by a network of international banks and that easy solutions to this problem have been found by means of the flexible working of this network of banks. Furthermore, these solutions were the only ones compatible with the impossibility of intergovernmental agreements and with tacit agreements between governments. But if there were a default by one of the constituent forces of the system--nonrepayment, for example--a situation could arise in which agreement between governments becomes a necessity. One must then wonder about the possibility and rapidity of such an agreement.

A third break zone relates to situations that are more difficult to describe--situations in which the accumulation of problems would be such that the machinery of governments would be incapable of dealing with the conjunction of these problems and would not manage to avoid gradual loss of control over the system.

Finally, there are--perhaps with lower probability--the risks of a break of a political or military character--not only the revolutions that will occur in certain Third World countries, but also more serious ruptures that could put the two great powers in jeopardy. We are entering a period in which these risks will be considerably heightened by the fact of the conjuncture of the internal situations in the Third World and the state of the military forces of the great powers.

The Possible Responses

In parallel with its thinking about breaks, the working group examined several scenarios of continuity and discusses the types of responses possible for France. The response that it views as desirable can be described as the search for an appropriate and creative development. In the group's view, an expression of this type implies several considerations.

First of all, it is necessary for French society as a whole to be aware of the fact that it is in a world in the process of changing profoundly and that the solutions consisting in shutting-off, withdrawal and rejection probably are not viable in the long term, if one refers to historical examples. Consequently, we cannot rule out adaptation.

But there are several ways of adapting. What is covered by the word "creative" is the necessity of active, positive adaptation, that seeks to preserve

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and develop the aspirations proper to French society. In a sense, this brings me back to my initial remark: the group does not believe that the international environment dictates all of French society's responses relating to its future.

The creative attitude can naturally lead us to modify very profoundly the means that have served us for pursuing a certain number of objectives in the past. We mention the functioning of the labor market, the role of the state as protector, the fight against inflation, etc.

In order to discover the ways of adaptive and creative development, it seemed to us that certain lines of orientation are priority ones: creating the conditions for civil society to ensure a large part of the adaptation; concentrating the state's action on piloting a small number of vertical areas (in which its action is absolutely essential, such as energy policy, for example, or support of research and development) and on the creation of the horizontal conditions for the functioning of society, permitting the economic agents to take a large part of the adaptations in charge. It is also necessary to develop differentiated international action, to work out an imaginative and realistic European policy that recognizes the birth of a family of nations and that gets bogged down less in the French political class's quite sterile debates on the European institutions.

Finally, there remains the problem of the behavior of the French. After the absorbing postwar period in which a consensus--a nonpolitical one--was established on the necessity of reexamining French society, we are now living in a second period of this kind, and the positive reaction of French society to the challenges of the future will depend above all on the French people's becoming aware of the new national and international facts.

Jean Fourastie--Mr Lesourne has painted an impressive picture and has described problems of which many are distressing, but he has done so with a confidence in the future that seems useful to me, because even though it could happen, if we go into the future with the idea that it will be catastrophic, it will be even more so. One must not dissemble the seriousness and unforeseeability of many of the problems that await us, but the country has to keep faith in itself and in its destiny.

Mr Lesourne did not talk about the demographic problem today, but I know that this problem is present in his mind. It is a good idea to call to mind the catastrophic evolution of the birth rate, not only in France but throughout Europe. The birth deficit is on the order of 10 to 20 percent in Europe in each generation. This demographic void can be filled only by countries that have a very strong surplus, whereas our countries are well below the replacement rate and some geographically close countries are far above it. This distressing situation should cease in a very short time. If it does not, I do not see how we can survive as a culture, civilization and nation.

Mr Lesourne spoke with reason about the educational needs of the young people who will be called on to have far more active international relations

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than today's with worlds of different culture. This is one of France's advantages. For more than 100 years, we have had a network of very effective and constant relations with certain countries of Black Africa, Latin America, etc. But these relations took place within the framework of a fundamental superiority of French culture. I, after our fathers and our grandfathers, have been accustomed to speaking before audiences of people of other nations who admired us, who loved us and who spoke our language. It was very agreeable, even around 1950-55, for a representative of France to speak before the organs of the OECD or the United Nations. When we spoke French, we were listened to, and one thought that we had something to say. This is no longer the case. Henceforth, our young people have to know foreign languages and cultures far better.

Our schools, our universities, have, of course, raised the average educational level of the French, from the cultural and technical point of view. This level is higher, on the whole, than what it was 50 or 100 years ago. Courteline's soldiers give a sad image of the cultural environment of the mass of the French people in 1900. We do not have that any longer. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental dilapidation of our schools. The schools have not raised the masses to themselves; the masses have degraded the schools.

But whoever desires to envision the future of France has to think about the elites, people of character, of imagination, constructive people, of profoundly original personality. We must build a future for France in an ingenious and original manner. This future will not be built on the average French person; it will be built on elites.

But it must be admitted that our schools are not easy on the elites. They have in a way raised the average quality, but I wonder whether they have done well in their role of training the elites. This is a considerable problem. Apart from certain of the specialist colleges, which for that matter are excessively oriented toward the mathematical techniques, we are very far from treating the elites properly.

Bertrand de Jouvenel--Mr Lesourne's talk was so rich that it is a little intimidating. I noted in passing that he made us feel the fragility of the countries of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean--the risks, for them, of the "post-oil" period. I mention that these countries used to be rich, to the point of being able to feed Italy, because they had trees; but after these trees were cut down, first by the Greeks and then by the Romans, these countries no longer had agriculture and became what they have remained for a long time. And now they are exposed to new threats. I do not think this has been spoken of much, in France.

Robert Reynaud--Mr Lesourne has spoken to us about possible breaks. Could he explain some of these scenarios to us, and the conclusions that he draws from them?

Jacques Lesourne--I expatiated little on the scenarios of break or continuity because we went into quite a bit of detail as regards the world evolution

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in the Interfuturs work and because one of the original aspects of our reflections has been the effort of the group chaired by Jacques Pelletier to bring out a certain number of European scenarios. Analyses should be combined at three levels: the level of the major tendencies and of the big ruptures possible at the world level, the level of the types of relations among the European countries, and the level of the responses of French society.

Naturally, not all the combinations of hypotheses at the three levels are significant. For example, it is difficult to imagine a Europe that increases its cooperation at the same time that values evolve in a fundamentally different among the various member countries.

As for breaks, they pose some very difficult problems because one does not know very well how to describe what is happening in the cumulative evolution phase.

Let us take a simple example: let us suppose that the Iranian problems are developing in the Middle East, that there is a revolution in Saudi Arabia and that a major oil-supply problem arises. Let us suppose also--a hypothesis that is not too improbable--that in these conditions there is a military intervention, by the United States, for example, for control of the wells and the pipelines. Let us postulate that this intervention is successful. Then what happens? One imagines the patrols along the pipelines to prevent sabotages, the gridding, the development of terrorism, and naturally not in Saudi Arabia only. Airport controls are increased, the ministries are protected everywhere. The Soviet Union remains prudent, because it is aware of the gravity of the situation but keeps itself in readiness to take advantage of any not excessively risky opportunity that might arise.

With such an example, one sees very well that what happens up to the revolution in Saudi Arabia can be described very well, but one then enters upon a process that depends on very random elements, on the conjunction of the calculations of the leaders of all the countries and the reaction of the peoples, etc.

You see that in analysis of breaks, the construction of scenarios is very difficult because of the way in which the cumulative phenomena are triggered.

Let us go back to the "continuity" scenarios that rule out the explosive cumulative situations. In Interfuturs, we had envisioned several eventualities:

- a scenario of strong growth that ran up against a certain number of impossibilities;
- a family of scenarios of moderate growth differing particularly in the different evolutions of values within the developed societies (one of these scenarios was close to the evolution that we actually know: moderate growth, unemployment, inflation, and simultaneously, incoherence in the aspirations of the different groups, and sometimes even of the same persons);

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--a scenario of protectionism between the poles of the developed world.

Study of this scenario showed us that the protectionism solutions were less probable than some considered them. For going partly in that direction constituted a response, to be sure, to pressures exerted on the governments, but (contrary to what happened after 1930) ran up against the reaction of other groups interested in exporting. One sees this very clearly in the French situation. Our automobile industry would be in serious crisis if it did not export, and if we did not export, we would not be able to import oil and raw materials. Protectionism therefore has a far greater chance of developing in a larval form than in a generalized way. Likewise, within the European Community the France-FRG combination remains (to prescind from certain vicissitudes) the driving force. But the differences between the economic structures of these two countries are a brake on the development of protectionism, at least in the next 15 years, because it is in the interest of the Federal Republic of Germany to keep its borders open.

If you would like more detail, I suggest that you refer to the last part of the "France in the World Tomorrow" report or to the Interfuturs report.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

NEW SDECE DIRECTOR--Hereafter, the French no 1 spy will bear the name of Fouillant. Hereafter or for several months to come because this is the waltz that is under the direction of the "intelligence section" of the SDECE (Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service). Col Alain de Gaigneron de Marolles, 53, did not last even one year. Before him, Brig Gen Rene Candelier retired without celebrating his second anniversary in the service. He was replaced by Col Bernard Grue who in turn had thrown in the sponge after 18 months. To find Fouillant, Alexandre de Marenches, the boss of SDECE, did not have to look very far: he was a member of his own civilian office. [Text] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 13 Sep 80 p 116] 5058

TERRORISM IN GUADELOUPE--There is worry in Guadeloupe and the volcano of la Soufriere is not there for nothing. Investigators from the DST (Directorate of Territorial Surveillance) and of RG (General Intelligence) are afraid of a monster assassination attempt. Underground separatists from the GLA (Armed Liberation Group) on 17 August stole several quintals of dynamite and 300 meters of Bickford cord from the Colas Highway Enterprise at Pointe-a-Pitre. [Text] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 13 Sep 80 p 117] 5058

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MORE POLICE--The 1981 budget has given the police priority consideration. The Ministry of Defense will be authorized to provide for 725 additional gendarmerie jobs, 83 of them for officers. These new jobs will account for 40 percent of next year's new jobs in the public sector, where recruitment will be nearly stopped. The gendarmerie will then have nearly 75,000 men. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 29 Sep 80 p 30]

MILITARY FUEL COSTS--The French armed forces are requesting an additional 300 million francs to cover fuel costs. The 1980 budget provided 2 billion francs for the purchase of fuel by the military, a sum based on a predicted increase of 26 percent in fuel production costs and which has proved insufficient. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 29 Sep 80 p 30]

SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION DEMAND--Georges Marchais, the PCF's presumed candidate in the presidential election, is going to drop a small "bomb." Concerning national independence, he will demand the construction of a seventh nuclear submarine to replace the first one [built], the "Redoutable," which will be obsolete before another 10 years. Marchais used Jean Marrane to try out the idea using [an article in] a small specialized publication of the PCF entitled ARMEE NATION. [Text] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 27 Sep 80 p 115]

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

CONSTITUTIONAL, ELECTORAL PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 3, 10, 24 Aug 80

[Article by Jose Miguel de Azaola: "Spanish Political Parties"]

[3 Aug 80 p 27: "I--A System in Crisis"]

[Text] The parliamentary elections for the autonomous communities of Catalonia and the Basque country, as well as the indications pointing to the establishment of a centrist Andalusian party, as a result of the 28 February referendum, brought to the forefront again the problem posed by the weakness of the political parties whose organization covers the whole of Spain, to the benefit of those others limited to the scope of an autonomous entity comprising a small group of communities (as in the Basque case, taking into account the special situation of Navarre). A few weeks later, the debate which began in the congress on 28 May, the vote on the socialist motion of censure and that which followed soon after concerning the amendment to the referendum law have served to remind Spaniards that they are governed exclusively by men of a party which lacks an absolute majority, both within the electoral body and within the Congress of Deputies (which weakens the strength of the executive branch), and that this chamber does not have a stable majority (which in turn weakens the legislative branch).

Within this context, the ever more insistent efforts to create a "radical" party (under that or another name, since it is not known if the miniscule Radical Party which has already been inscribed on the pertinent register would be prepared to allow itself to be inundated by the promoters of this other "radicalism" and their more or less numerous followers), the political role and strategy of which seem to be based on the composition of the congress elected on 1 March 1979 (but not that of the Senate elected simultaneously, nor that of the Cortes elected subsequently), are not very certain to contribute to clarifying the Spanish political picture or to giving the government and the chambers the strength, and with it the authority, they are visibly losing.

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In the chamber which some absurdly call "lower" (because since it is more powerful and influential than the other, it is obviously superior in theory, to say nothing of practice, currently very unfavorable to the Senate), the "radical sector" which might be established, consistent with the dreams of its promoters, bourgeois liberals tinged with moderate socialism, by the deputies of the right wing (let us call it that) of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and those of the left wing (let us call it that) of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] could obtain the seats necessary (if it could win over some 40 members from the UCD) to form a majority with the deputies remaining in the PSOE (provided they bear no grudge against the converts), the Basque and Catalan nationalists and the occasional member of the CD [Democratic Convergence] group (Areilza, Senillosa), who might even fit the label "radical." If those who desert the UCD do not total 40, matters are very simple. In order to be carried out, this project would require the continuing support of the communists, thus creating certain problems which could bring this whole plan down. In any case, the most serious difficulties would arrive when the draft laws reached the Senate, which is adamant in its attitude on everything affecting the fate of the government, but in which a majority and resentful UCD would speedily see some virtues and a legislative capacity which to date it has seemed to ignore. And the draft laws approved by the new majority in the congress might well in any case founder on the reefs of the Spanish naval garrisons.

This is the case where the present parliament is concerned. In future parliamentary ventures far to the left; [line or lines apparently missing from text here]. Secondly, that its contribution is indispensable for establishing any majority (which would almost always leave its hands free to act as an arbiter and choose one or the other of these two parties as an ally; and third, to remain firmly in power, although without having the largest parliamentary group numerically. But for this to occur, it would be necessary for both the PSOE and the UCD to be permanently incapable of obtaining an absolute majority (either by themselves, or allied with those on their left, thus remaining with those to the right of them) or of reaching an agreement between them behind the backs, or over the heads, of the "radicals"; and that the socialist voters not lose patience with the inability of their party ever to govern with a leftist program, just as the same thing must not happen with the UCD voters, with regard to their party, only in the opposite direction; and that the "radical group" not exhaust itself excessively, by dint of staying always in the government; and that the peripheral nationalisms retain relatively modest dimensions. All of which also remains to be seen.

We have the example of the FRG, where the liberals in the FDP [Free Democratic Party] have been in power for more than 30 years, with no interruption other than the relatively brief period in which there was a CDU [Christian Democratic Union]-FPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] coalition government, some 15 years ago. The rest of the time, the FDP has governed, first with the Christian Democrats and later with the Social Democrats, and God

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knows when it will step down from power. Why hasn't the same thing happened in Spain? We have already copied the FRG in the matter of the "constructive" censure vote, with the difference that there they waited more than 20 years before putting it in practice, while here we did so before even 20 months had passed. If we are copying the FDP in Spain, what will the difference between the copy and the original be? Will it lie in the fact that while the FDP has governed thus far for almost 30 years (taking the interruption mentioned above into account), our "radical sector" would govern for about 30 months? This could be. With the difference (yet another) that, at the dizzying rate at which things are going in our Spain, it will seem to our politicians and to the people too, indeed, that 30 months is an eternity.

The truth is that where the essence of the present Spanish party system is concerned, and apart from whether or not the "radical sector" succeeds in creating a structure strong enough to play a considerable role or not, what is important is that the system is in crisis, and it is necessary to overcome this crisis, not to continue to function within the system itself.

This latter effort depends (here, as in other countries) on three factors: the electoral system (whether proportional, more or less pure, or majority, in its various modalities); the form of the state (centralized, federated or another kind); and finally, the ideological traditions of the electorally active public. Our electoral system is nowadays proportional, but there is talk of amending it, and we do not know if it will continue to be proportional. The form of our state has ceased to be centralized, and we do not know what it will be tomorrow. It is necessary to begin by clarifying these two unknown factors in order to decide how to interlink the old ideological traditions with the new situation.

[10 Aug 80, p 27: "II--The Electoral System and the Form of the State"]

[Text] After noting the crisis through which the political party system in Spain is passing, I listed at the end of the preceding article the three factors on which this system depends: the electoral system, the form of the state and the ideological tendencies of the voters.

It is a known fact that the proportional electoral system tends to increase the number of political parties and parliamentary groups, while the majority system tends to reduce it. But this statement needs to be carefully qualified. For example, in Germany (where pure proportionality during the Weimar Republic led to the splintering of the political forces), the legislation of the federal republic imposes the requirement that to win any seats, a slate of candidates must win at least 5 percent of the valid votes cast. As a result of this, there are only three parties represented in the legislative assemblies, and even so the liberals are excluded in some places, leading to a pure bipartisan system.

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In France on the other hand the majority system with uninominal districts calls for a second ballot if no candidate wins an absolute majority on the first, thus allowing a number of parties which engage in greedy bargaining on the votes won on the first ballot by their respective candidates with a view to the second, to survive.

The proportional system in Spain is not pure (it can never be when the number of representatives which a district must elect is established in advance), and the so-called "Hondt" system guarantees the least unjust form of impure proportionality. The result is a proliferation of parties and parliamentary groups which makes the formation of a consistent and stable majority difficult. This would not be avoided by introducing a majority system of the French sort, which would in addition favor the formation of blocs in sharp conflict one with another. Where a proportional system of the German sort is concerned (with the 5-percent barrier) it would have the consequence in our country of reducing the number of parties with representation in the congress to 4 and eliminating from it all the local parties. This is something which would be viewed very dimly, mainly by the Basque and Catalan peoples, whose representation in congress would thus automatically be lacking the majority forces in their respective autonomous communities, which would prevent recognition of the democratic legitimacy of this representation. And if a formula for allowing three or four local political forces to participate in the congress, being added to the four whose active scope covers all of Spain, the resulting situation would be very little different from the present one.

A majority system with uninominal districts and a single ballot would leave the field solely to the two major political forces in almost all the districts. But, which forces? For it would be necessary to establish alliances, dividing up the districts of a province or an autonomous community. One must in fact imagine a province with five districts: party A nominates a candidate in three of them, while B does so in the other two, and both urge their respective voters to support the candidate of the other party where there is none of their own. An agreement (possible but not certain) between the UCD and the PSOE not to establish alliances of this type and to nominate candidates for the elections in all, or almost all, the electoral districts, would in practice reduce the forces with representation in the congress and a scope of activity covering the whole of Spain to these two parties. However it would not prevent the presence in that chamber of the principal local parties (PNV [Basque Nationalist Party], Convergence and Unity, and even the PSA [Socialist Party of Andalusia] or a possible Andalusian "key" group) strong enough to win out in various districts of their respective regions, either by absolute or relative majority. In such a case there would be five or six political groups in the congress, of which those with exclusively local influence might have together some 40 deputies, making it almost impossible for one of the "leading 2" to control an absolute majority of the seats. This would be true for the PSOE because the current distribution of its deputies by province clearly favors the rural zone, and for the UCD, because in Catalonia and the

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Basque region the center-right vote is rallied in many districts around the Convergence and Union or the PNV, respectively.

What possibility is there that these and other local parties will in some way join the large parties whose scope of action is Spain as a whole? This depends, first of all, on that other factor, which is the form of the state.

Naturally, such an incorporation is impossible in a centralized state, whose survival presumes that the two large parties want to maintain it. Nor can it be possible while the "state of autonomies" continues to involve, as it now does, a constant ebb and flow between the authorities of the autonomous communities, on the one hand, and the central authority and/or the other autonomous communities, on the other, because in such a context many citizens in each of these latter want to assign representation of them to the force which at each time gives priority concern to their particular interests. Thus the local parties will continue to strengthen, and this will bring with it an aggravation of the current crisis in the party system. Only the standardization of the autonomous communities with a uniform, or almost uniform, spread of authority (in other words, in practice, a federal system, under this or another name) could overcome this obstacle. Now then, in order for the proliferation of parties within a system to disappear in this way, it would be essential for the internal structure of the large political forces to be very decentralized, since the autonomous communities would not be willing to allow the freedoms they have brought in through the main door of the constitution and the autonomous statutes to escape through the side door of party centralism (an extreme example of this is the denaturalizing of Soviet federalism through the "democratic" centralism of the Communist Party).

But even presuming--and it is a presumption, if one is familiar with our "leading two" and those attempting to drive the "radical" wedge between them--that the "state of autonomous municipalities" were to become federal in practice, and that there were broad decentralization of the structures of the UCD and the PSOE, there would still be difficulties in rationalizing and correcting our political party system. These difficulties are dictated to a great extent by the third factor which must be analyzed, i.e. the ideological traditions of the electorally active public.

[24 Aug 80 p 25: "III--Myths and Reform"]

[Text] In my two preceding articles I discussed the crisis in the Spanish political party system and examined the possible consequences to it of changing the electoral system and federalizing the "state of autonomous communities." Along with the electoral system and the form of the state, the third of the main determining factors in the political party system involves the ideological traditions of the electoral body.

We are not using ideology here as synonymous with thinking. The political thought which really predominates today in certain traditional groups such

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as the PSOE, the PNV or the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] (the last-mentioned considerably less traditional than the other two) is substantially different from that of Pablo Iglesias or Francisco Largo Caballero, Sabino Arana or La Pasionaria, politically extinct now for some years. But their names have mythical force and thus are endowed with a magical power of attraction, thanks to which the ability to use them provides a considerable electoral advantage (independent of the ideological content) over other groups which attempt to fish for votes in the sociological waters where these myths exercise their magic power.

But along with their great virtues, myths have serious disadvantages. The history of sacred idols is not made up solely of brilliant pages laden with glory, and this history is either taken over blindly and idealized, or it is taken over critically and reviewed (as the German Social Democrats did at their celebrated Bad Godesberg congress). And in the latter case, demystification occurs and the magic spell is broken. While it seeks to exploit its myth, the PSOE must assume responsibility, among other things, for the revolutionary general strike of 1917 and (like Esquerra) the 1934 rebellion against the democratically legitimized authority of the republic. The same is true of the PCE with regard to its Stalinist era, and the PNV with regard to racism, theocratic integrism and Sabino Arana's independence movement (but not its 11th-hour pro-Spanish swing, which Arana himself did not decide to join, recommending it as a method to his followers instead, while personally retiring from political life).

The UCD, a youthful emanation of a moderate, pragmatic and in a number of cases purely opportunistic oligarchy, was well prepared by origins and inclination to head the transition of the country from autocracy to democracy. And now that this transition is well along and about to be completed, and now that what is mainly involved is no longer establishing democracy but consolidating and sustaining it, it is natural that the party created to direct the transition is bestirring itself and working hard to find an identity, a form and a definitive role within the context of the new state of affairs. In order not to disappear with the historic stage for which it was born, it needs to adapt itself to what is now beginning. No matter that this new stage is to a very great extent its accomplishment. If it does not succeed in adapting to it, and as it has not had time to put down deep roots in society, much less to convert itself into a myth, the UCD will lose a clientele in whose eyes it will no longer be capable of serving a useful function, and its representation in the future Cortes may be reduced to what that of the republican left was in the parliament elected in 1933.

With the exception of the PNV (and perhaps the Convergence and Union, as the heir to the League--although the Catalan case is far less certain, for I believe that despite his nationalism, the rational factor contributed to the electoral success of Pujol, at least as much as the mythical factor), there are only two great mobilizing myths in the right-wing sector of Spain today, now that--as I have already said--the myth of political Catholicism

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has been eclipsed. They are the myths of Franco and the crown. The vast majority of the votes cast for the UCD on 15 June 1977, and a good part of those on 1 March 1979, were due not to the personal charm of President Suarez, but the feeling (correct) of the people that this politician was "the king's man." But Don Juan Carlos, who had chosen him to direct the transition, had been removing himself to take the place assigned him by the constitution, such that the UCD would obtain results contrary to those expected if it committed a very unlikely error of trying to exploit this myth. And it cannot utilize the Franco myth (the most it can do, and is doing, is to seem as little opposed to Franco as possible), while if the Popular Alliance can (in addition, obviously, to the extreme right wing), and Prof Fraga has taken great care to assure us that it is taking full responsibility for its own history in the Franco era, and urges the country to do the same.

Having thus set sail in the same vessel, the two great parties, in order to make themselves rationally necessary, will have to carry out two reforms. One of them involves establishing by common agreement a pure majority electoral system (uninominal districts, a single ballot and an agreement between the two not to seek alliances with third parties in any district). Its rivals on the right and on the left will thus be practically eliminated (but not the nationalist parties with the strongest local influence), and the candidates they elect will have for themselves that political stature and security which is lacking for one who is but another name in a closed slate to the voter.

The other reform, which the parties will have to undertake separately, is their own internal reform (much more profound in the UCD than in the PSOE), in order to adapt their structures to those of a federated or quasi-federated state, the transition to which is still in its inception: autonomous local sections determining the general policy of the party, from the base upward, instead of this universally discredited "democratic centralism" (which is often, particularly in the UCD, very doubtfully democratic). This should make it easier for them to arrange permanent and close alliances, where this is desirable, with parties having purely local support, with which they will seek to compete in their own territory, to the extent that these parties truly integrate themselves in the new institutions, and simultaneous with the decline of their individualistic aggressions, their desire for direct participation in the central organs of government strengthens (this already existed in the Catalan members of the League and Esquerra more than 60 years ago, but it was never a characteristic of Basque nationalism, except during the confusion of the civil war). In this realm, the PSOE has already taken some steps and must go farther.

I do not believe that application of the formula I have just summarized will limit the capacity of the leaders of our two great parties for imagination and action, but despite the fact that this would be the best means of correcting the Spanish political party system in depth, it could

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enter into conflict with their ambitions, as well as with their short-term interests. However, I am persuaded that if this formula is not applied, or if it is only half-applied or reluctantly or badly applied, our party system will continue to deteriorate to the great detriment of democracy and many other things, all of them of the greatest importance. It is true that political life is very different from the realm of mathematics or chemistry, for which reason this formula may not perhaps have the desired effects. In which case, is there perhaps another better one?

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